THE SUBJECT OF SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, POLITICS AND MORAL REASONING IN HUGO GROTIUS by Brett, Annabel
The subject of sovereignty. Law, politics and moral reasoning in Hugo Grotius* 
Annabel Brett, Cambridge 
Introduction 
The genealogical turn taken by much of the best recent scholarship in the history of political 
thought has brought with it a new interest in the way that Hugo Grotius thinks about sovereign 
power. In The sleeping sovereign, Richard Tuck argues that the conceptual move critical to the 
modern idea of sovereignty is the distinction between sovereignty and administration or 
government, a distinction that Bodin and Hobbes make but that Grotius does not. Heir to the 
scholastics in this respect, Grotius does not have a modern theory of sovereignty.1 A different 
perspective is offered by Quentin Skinner, for whom the scholastic language of summa 
potestas, supreme power, does form part of the genealogy of modern sovereignty.2 In his most 
recent From humanism to Hobbes, Skinner develops his view to focus on the subject of 
sovereign power, the civitas or “state.” He suggests that a theory of state sovereignty, as 
opposed to popular sovereignty, connects Grotius with Hobbes.3 Skinner’s view contrasts, in 
turn, with that of Daniel Lee, who argues, in Popular sovereignty in early modern 
constitutional thought, that Grotius’s appeal to the Roman law of property allows him to 
maintain a kind of popular sovereignty (in the sense that the people remains “free”) under 
monarchy except for the case of the patrimonial kingdom.4  
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In my own previous treatment of the subject, I suggested that Grotius’s theory was uneasily 
caught between two different models of the political “body” – the civitas and the populus, or 
“people” – and consequently between two different models of political power, scholastic 
potestas and Hobbesian imperium.5 I now think, however, that the fluidity with which Grotius 
moves between these terms is in fact a marker of a new understanding of civitas in The Law of 
War and Peace, and correspondingly of a new conception of the international political order.6 
In the present contribution, I develop that perspective by revisiting his theory of sovereignty in 
the light of the recent literature. I begin, however, not with sovereignty but with the kind of 
reasoning Grotius deems appropriate to handling it. I argue that Grotius’s mature jurisprudence, 
in respect of both natural and positive law, is supplemented and conditioned by a broader set 
of principles that he calls “morals.” This field of reasoning has debts to scholastic moral 
theology, giving the continuity with scholastic thought identified by Tuck and others, but it 
also has its roots in Aristotelian moral science as understood by Grotius’s contemporaries. To 
unearth that context is to reveal again the importance of Aristotle and Aristotelian commentary 
to early modern thought on sovereignty, including the Roman exemplum, which historians such 
as Noah Dauber, Kinch Hoekstra, Melissa Lane and Sophie Smith as well as Tuck have lately 
done so much to make visible.7 Approaching the question from this angle, I argue in a second 
move that Grotius’s anti-Bodinian argument for temporary and divisible sovereignty is 
distinctively his own insofar as it represents a modulation between law and “morals.” I suggest, 
moreover, that precisely this modulation allows him both to separate his own scientific 
jurisprudence from the science of politics, in a way that he argues Bodin has failed to do, and 
nevertheless to reply to the political scientists on their own turf. 
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However much, then, Grotius was indebted to the scholastic account of summa potestas – and 
he surely was – his conception of sovereignty is shaped by a different intellectual enterprise 
and cannot easily be assimilated either to the scholastic or indeed to any other early modern 
account. But that enterprise is not merely one of putting political scientists and Bodinian 
confusion in their place. Grotius’s theory of sovereignty in The Law of War and Peace was 
articulated in and for a context that he perceived as primarily international – or, better, inter-
political, referring to the concept of “interpolity” developed by Lauren Benton and her 
colleagues to characterize the fluid legal regimes of the early modern imperial world:  a 
complex web of cross-state relationships that defy the modern contrast between the 
international and the domestic.8 I suggest that, for him, interpolity in this sense is not merely 
actual, in a way that theories like Bodin’s fail to recognize, but normative, insofar as its willing 
embrace of overlap and hybridity is a facilitator of peace; and I argue that the mobilization of 
“morals” is critical to its realization. 
Establishing the framework necessary for inter-political peace comes, however, with a key 
consequence for what we might think of as “domestic” politics, one that is not merely incidental 
but central to its conceptual construction. It is that sovereignty in exercise has no necessary 
location in the people that are the object of its power. It can be exercised by anyone or anything 
that is capable of so doing, from inside or outside the commonwealth, provided that they have 
been legitimately instituted in some way.9 The functional conception of sovereignty that Anne 
Orford sees behind the modern international law doctrine of “responsibility to protect” makes 
an illuminating comparison. On her account, it is this conception that allows protection to be 
taken over by international bodies such as the UN, or by other nations on international 
authority, should the sovereign of a particular nation fail to exercise it. The result is an 
“international executive rule” that is politically disempowering for the very people whose need 
for protection provides the justification for international intervention.10 One might put the point 
more generally by saying that a functional conception of sovereignty is inherently anti-
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democratic in the sense that it is not necessarily democratic. In Tuck’s genealogy, which is not 
merely one of modern sovereignty but of modern democracy, the point about indivisible and 
permanent sovereignty is that, ultimately, it turns the people into the sovereign. Sacrifice 
indivisibility and permanence for functionality and you remove, on this account, the 
foundations upon which modern democracy is built.  
It is not the purpose of this article to rescue Grotius from democratic critique by suggesting 
that he was, in spite of appearances, some kind of democrat or theorist of popular sovereignty. 
In my view, he very clearly was not. Nor am I trying to place him somewhere on the spectrum 
of modernity. In a genealogy of international executive rule, Grotian sovereignty appears just 
as “modern” as in a genealogy of democracy it does not. Instead, what I shall hope to show is 
that Grotian sovereignty resists this either/or. It deliberately defies the Bodinian conception of 
domestic sovereignty, and it challenges the ideological invocation of “the people” that pulls 
modern democracies towards forms of national populism. At the same time, however, it equally 
challenges the political evasions through which functionalist international regimes absolve 
themselves from direct democratic accountability. In a world of profound tension and even 
polarity between the two, Grotius’s inter-political alternative is still worth thinking through.  
1. – “Morals” 
In passing, throughout The Law of War and Peace, Grotius makes reference to a category of 
“morals” (moralia, materia moralis – “moral things,” “moral matters”). The casual way in 
which he uses this language implies that his reader will immediately know what he means. And 
indeed, there were two obvious points of reference for a moderately well-educated reader of 
the early seventeenth century. One was Aristotelian ethics in contemporary Latin philosophical 
commentary, where the Greek term ethica was translated into a vocabulary of moralia or 
simply mores. The other was scholastic moral theology, to which Grotius paid his respects in 
the preface by conceding that, for all their deficiencies, “when they [the scholastics] agree on 
a matter of morals (in re morum), they are almost never wrong.”11 These theologians were 
Aristotelians too, in their way. But neither they nor the philosophers were slavish adherents to 
everything Aristotle said, and both interpreted him in ways that are often at odds with modern 
                                                          
11 Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis (henceforth IBP), ed. Jean Barbeyrac (Amsterdam, 1720), 
Prolegomena, n. 52. I have used this edition for ease of collation with the readily available eighteenth-
century English translation which is edited by Richard Tuck as The Rights of War and Peace 
(Indianapolis 2005), although all translations here are my own. The Barbeyrac edition is not always 
accurate, and I have from time to time signaled a divergence from editions overseen by Grotius. 
views of “Aristotelianism”.12 Appreciating the complex triangulation between scholastic 
casuistry, Aristotelian philosophy and Aristotle himself is vital to understanding the question 
of “morals” in Grotius’s thought. It is not the same question as whether he was or was not an 
ethical eudaemonist or moral realist.13 This is not to say that there is no relationship between 
virtue and “morals” in his thought; there is, as I shall hint at the end of Section IV. But for a 
better appreciation of his enterprise, we need to start by distinguishing between the two.14 
In the scholastic moral theology of Grotius’s time, the basic sense of the “moral” was 
established through a contrast with the “natural.”15 This in turn involved a further contrast, 
between freedom and necessity. Natural things are necessitated, as ice necessarily melts in the 
sun, for example. But moral things are a function of the human will, which is free. For example, 
whether you pay your rent or not is freely chosen and therefore a moral rather than a natural 
action. This does not mean that there is no concept of necessity in morals, but it is moral 
necessity, not natural necessity. Moral necessity is generated by the “end,” the final cause, 
which does not operate physically but morally, in making something the only morally possible 
choice for the will (even though, consistently with free-will, it remains naturally free to do 
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side, Benjamin Straumann, “Adam Smith’s unfinished Grotius business, Grotius’s novel turn to ancient 
law, and the genealogical fallacy,” Grotiana 38 (2017), 211-228, and Richard Tuck, “The ‘modern’ 
theory of natural law,” in Anthony Pagden ed., The Languages of Political Thought in Early Modern 
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divided Christendom, 1500-1625,” in Paolo Amorosa, Mónica Rovira-García Salmones and Martti 
Koskenniemi eds., International Law and Religion: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
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moral in Grotius’s thought, though from a different perspective, is Stefanie Ertz, “Hugo Grotius’s 
hermeneutics of natural and divine law,” Grotiana 37 (2016), 61-94, and see now also Martti 
Koskenniemi, “Imagining the rule of law. Rereading the Grotian tradition,” European Journal of 
International Law, forthcoming.  
15 See Annabel Brett, “Human freedom and Jesuit moral theology,” in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin 
Skinner eds., Freedom and the Construction of Europe, Volume 2 (Cambridge, 2012), 9-26; Dennis 
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London, 1996), 168-211; Michael J. Murray, ‘Pre-Leibnizian moral necessity’, The Leibniz Review 14 
(2004), 1-64.  
something else). Importantly for our purposes, however, “morality” does not apply to actions 
alone. It also involves a range of moral entities that are created by precisely this (moral) action 
of the (free) will. For example, your obligation to pay the rent is a moral entity caused by your 
free will determining itself to a certain contractual arrangement. Moral entities also all include 
laws, rights, powers, offices, statuses, prices and signs – in fact, all of what we would call the 
social and political world and its institutions; and moral theology is, accordingly, the governing 
science of that world. 
Grotius’s debt to this tradition was recognized close to his own time – Leibniz, for example, 
counted him “among the most eminent” of the casuists.16 We can now see, however, that moral 
theology in the kinds of people Grotius was reading did not reduce to the casuistry of individual 
obligation that it later became, thereby earning a bad name for itself.17 For a writer like the 
Jesuit Francisco Suárez, casuistry does not merely say what law a subject can safely disobey 
in certain circumstances; it governs what counts as law itself. The astonishing political 
confidence of that voice was recognized by its adversaries in England, from Alberico Gentili 
who commanded the theologians to “keep silence” to Sir Francis Bacon who derided Suárez 
as “a daring and confident writer, a fellow that thinks with his magistrality and quill-pen to 
give laws and menages unto crowns and sceptres.”18 But for Grotius, who (as we shall see) 
read Suárez’s The Laws and God the Lawgiver very soon after it came out in 1612, that 
confidence was something he could use: scholastic “morals” provided a way to establish the 
contours of law in circumstances beyond the domain of civil law and of technical legal 
reasoning. Thus, concerning the natural right to self-preservation, Grotius deployed the concept 
of moral necessity to argue that someone who has the right to the end must also have a right to 
the means.19 Equally, concerning the obligations of travelers, he borrowed from Suárez to argue 
that “for the government of a people it is morally necessary that those who mingle with them 
even only temporarily, as happens when they enter the territory, should render themselves 
conformable to the institutions of that people.”20 Both of these examples fall outside the strict 
                                                          
16 Theodicy, § 182; I owe the reference to Mautner, “From virtue to morality,” 231. 
17 See the discussion in Jennifer Pitts, Boundaries of the International. Law and Empire (Cambridge 
MA, 2018), 79-81.  
18 Alberico Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, ed. T.E. Holland (Oxford 1927), I. 12, p. 55; Francis Bacon, 
The charge against William Talbot in The Works of Lord Bacon, in two volumes, with an introductory 
essay (London: William Ball, 1838), p. 688, col.1. 
19 IBP III.1.2.1. 
20 IBP II.2.5. I discuss this example further in Brett, “The space of politics,” 43. 
scope of domestic law, and, in both, moral reasoning is used to establish legal norms that apply 
to all persons in such circumstances.  
The salience of circumstance was a general principle that connected scholastic casuistry with 
Aristotelian moral philosophy in a broadly humanist vein.21 In Book I of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle had contrasted ethical science with mathematics on grounds of the variability 
of the phenomena it studies. An educated person, he suggested, will not expect the same degree 
of precision in all areas of enquiry.22 Alberico Gentili had invoked this principle in support of 
his own enterprise of theorizing international jurisprudence at the opening of De iure belli 
(1598).23 Grotius, in his chapter on doubtful causes of war in Book II, enthusiastically agreed. 
“What Aristotle says is very true, that in morals certainty cannot be found equally as in the mathematical 
disciplines.” Whereas mathematical phenomena abstract from all matter, in morals even the least 
“circumstances” alter the matter; and, whereas mathematical forms have no “in-between” 
(there is nothing in between curved and straight, for example), moral forms have an extensive 
“in-between”, such that they can tend now to one extreme and now to the other.24 Grotius 
invoked a related principle in his discussion of what counts as a legitimate political community 
(civitas) under the law of war. Against Cicero, Grotius insisted that lapses from strict justice 
do not automatically disqualify a civitas, because “in morals (in moralibus), the principal [that 
is, as Grotius clarifies, the predominant element in the mix] is taken for the form.”25 Another 
key international legal norm, then, is here shown to be established by appeal to “morals.” 
Despite this broad area of agreement, Aristotelian philosophers needed to address the technical 
method of moral science in a way that the casuists, for whom it was subsumed under theology, 
did not. Aristotle’s elliptical remarks in Nicomachean Ethics Book I about arguing to first 
principles or from first principles were the subject of intense debate in the late sixteenth century 
between the Paduan philosopher Jacopo Zabarella and the Sienese Francesco Piccolomini.26 
                                                          
21 See Margaret Sampson, “Laxity and liberty in seventeenth-century English political thought,” in E. 
Leites ed., Conscience and Casuistry in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1988), 72-118, at 78. 
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and tr. R. Crisp (Cambridge, 2000), Book I, Ch. 3, 4-5. 
23 Gentili, De iure belli, I.1, p. 10.  
24 IBP II.23.1-2. This chapter explicitly juxtaposes the most up-to-date humanist Aristotelian 
scholarship with scholastic moral theology. 
25 IBP III.3.2.1-3. 
26 See David A. Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300-1650). The Universities 
and the Problem of Moral Education (Leiden, 2002), Ch. 7. The passage in question is Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book I, Ch. 4, p. 6 (tr. Crisp): “Let us not forget, however, that there is a difference between 
arguments from first principles and arguments to first principles… For, while we should begin from 
Zabarella had argued that in the practical sciences, including ethics, not only the method of 
investigation, but also the order of presentation, must be “resolutive” (or “analytic”) rather than 
“compositive” (or “synthetic”). “Resolution” involves tracking back to first principles, from 
effect to cause; “composition” the reverse, tracking forward from the principles, from cause to 
effect. Piccolomini had agreed that this was Aristotle’s order of investigation in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, but had denied that the order of presentation must always be “resolutive.” 
Instead, in his highly original and influential Universa philosophia de moribus, he adopted a 
“compositive” order, forward from the nature of man to the nature of commonwealth itself.27 
The work was well-known to Gentili, who referred to it at the very start of his De iure belli in 
distinguishing contemporary moral and political philosophy from his own enterprise as a jurist 
of the law of nations.28 Grotius himself cited it in Book II, Chapter 23, the chapter on doubtful 
causes that we have just looked at.29 
Subsequent commentators largely agreed on the resolutive as opposed to the compositive 
approach to both investigation and presentation, a distinction that was also near-universally 
framed in terms of a posteriori versus a priori. But they disagreed on what the relevant effects 
and causes were. Grotius’s fellow Dutchman, Hubert van Giffen (Giphanius), was one of the 
most acute of all Renaissance commentators on both the Ethics and the Politics, cited in 
Gronovius’s notes to The law of war and peace although not by Grotius himself. In his 
commentary on the Ethics, published posthumously in 1608, van Giffen argued that the 
principles we seek are not causes at all, but explanations. He kept the language of “effects,” 
however, arguing that these are human actions themselves. In moral science, then, we track 
back from the actions to what explains them, which are the principles of natural law.30 
                                                          
things known, they are known in two senses: known by us, and known without qualification. 
Presumably we have to begin from things known by us… For the first principle is the belief that 
something is the case, and if this is sufficiently clear, he will not need the reason why as well.” 
27 Francesco Piccolomini, Universa philosophia de moribus (Venice, 1583), Introductio, Cap. 21-24, 
31-32. 
28 Gentili, De iure belli, I.1, at 1. 
29 Grotius’s citation in fact dates back to his earlier De iure praedae, Ch. 7, p. 124 in M. van Ittersum 
ed., Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (Indianapolis, 2006). The marginal reference in both 
cases is to Piccolomini’s “Civil Philosophy Lib. VI, cap. XXI,” i.e. Universa philosophia de moribus, 
Gradus VI, cap. 21, fol. 354. The reference to “Civil Philosophy” is explained by the fact that, for 
Piccolomini, moral philosophy just is civil philosophy, and his headings reflect this fact. See below, p. 
000. 
30 Obertus Giphanius (Hubert van Giffen), Commentarii in decem libros Aristotelis ethicorum ad 
Nicomachum (Frankfurt, 1608), Lib. I, Cap. 4, p. 29. 
Zabarella’s German student Johannes Magirus, author of a more popular textbook called the 
Corona virtutum moralium (“A crown of moral virtues,” 1614), argued more standardly that 
resolution proceeds from effects to causes. For him, the effects are the virtuous actions that we 
see around us, and we track back to their causes, which are the virtues themselves.31  
Grotius appealed to the “resolutive” procedure in a key passage of Book I, to support his 
argument that the dictator in ancient Rome was genuinely a sovereign and not merely some 
kind of minister. Given, he suggested, that the dictator exercised all the functions of 
sovereignty, he was sovereign; the temporary duration of his sovereignty did not affect its 
nature as such. This argument was clearly directed against Bodin.32 What has received less 
comment, however, is the “moral” reasoning behind it: “the nature of moral things is known 
from their works (operationes), which is why those faculties that have the same effects, are to 
be called by the same name.”33 Here, we track back from the effects to the causes, just as in 
Aristotelian moral science. But we do not do so in exactly the same way as in the commentators 
we have looked at, since sovereign power is neither a virtue nor a principle of natural law. 
Instead, as we shall see in more detail in the next section, it is a “moral faculty,” a moral entity, 
and we discern it by distinguishing between works (operationes) and actions (actiones). Again, 
then, Grotius fused Aristotelian moral science with scholastic moral theology to answer a 
question that Alberico Gentili, in his key chapter on international intervention, had insisted 
could not be a purely “domestic” issue: what power counts as sovereign power.34 
2. – Moral, legal and political science 
So far we have seen how Grotius used a hybrid concept of “morals” to solve questions of law 
in international contexts. But it is still not clear quite how he understood the nature of the 
interface between legal and moral reasoning. Both scholastic and humanist Aristotelians would 
have seen the science of law, properly understood, as continuous with the field of morals. For 
the scholastics, as we have seen, law was a key effect of the operation of the free will and thus 
a central part of moral theology. For the humanist commentators on Aristotle, the matter was a 
bit more complicated because it was not clear that Aristotle had a science of law, in the sense 
of a jurisprudence, at all. He had nomothetikē, the science of legislation, and he had dikastikē, 
                                                          
31 Ioannes Magirus, Corona virtutum moralium (Frankfurt, 1614), pp. 30-32.  
32 See Tuck, Sleeping Sovereign, 23-5 (for Bodin), 70-83 (for Grotius). 
33 IBP I.3.11.2: rerum moralium natura ex operationibus cognoscitur, quare quae facultates eosdem 
effectus habent, eodem nomine nuncupandae sunt. 
34 Gentili, De iure belli, I.16. 
the art of judgement, but neither of these seemed quite to accommodate what van Giffen 
recognized as a distinctively Roman idea. Nevertheless, both Piccolomini and van Giffen found 
a place for it in relation to nomothetikē, the more universal and philosophical side of political 
science as laid down by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics Book VI, Ch. 8.35 Differently from 
the commentators, however, Grotius’s intellectual enterprise did not require him to find an 
Aristotelian solution at all costs. He made this plain in the preface, acknowledging Aristotle as 
the first of philosophers but refusing to agree with him on everything, in particular his notorious 
argument that every virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency.36 Inept for all the virtues, 
this principle was peculiarly deficient for justice and for its object, the iustum (“what is right” 
or “the right thing”). 
Grotius had, in fact, argued against the Aristotelian conception of justice from the very 
beginning of his natural jurisprudence, The Law of Prize of 1604/5. Here, he set out instead to 
arrive at “what is right” in a totally different way, joining a raging sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century debate about how to make law into a science (ius in artem redigendum).37 For Grotius 
this meant going back to “the fount of nature,” ad fontem naturae.38 In the preface to The Law 
of War and Peace, Grotius again stressed the importance of science (ars), and as in The Law 
of Prize, too, he grounded his effort in nature. He declared that naturalia, natural things, can 
be made into a science (ars) because they are certain and invariable. The implicit contrast is 
with moralia, those imprecise and circumstantially varying phenomena that are the object of 
Aristotelian moral science and scholastic moral theology.39 In a key move, however, he 
borrowed from Suárez’s scholastic opponent Gabriel Vázquez in taking natural law out of the 
operation of the free will, even God’s. Instead, natural law is simply what is necessarily fitting 
or unfitting to rational nature – or, as Grotius crucially added a little further on, rational and 
                                                          
35 Piccolomini, Universa philosophia, Gradus V, cap. 38, fo. 293-4; van Giffen, In libros ethicorum, 
Lib. VI, cap. 8, p. 489. See further below, p. 000 and 000. 
36 IBP, Prolegomena, nn. 40-45. 
37 For an overview, including Grotius, see James Gordley, The Jurists: A Critical History (Oxford, 
2013), 111-140. Benjamin Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature. The Classical Foundations 
of Hugo Grotius’s Natural Law (Cambridge, 2015), 103-129, stresses the anti-Aristotelianism. 
38 van Ittersum ed., Commentary, Ch. 1, p. 17. The Latin text can be found in Hugo Grotius, De jure 
praedae commentarius, 2 vols. (Oxford 1950), Vol. II: Collotype reproduction of the original Latin 
manuscript.  
39 IBP, Prolegomena, n. 30. For naturalia as contrasted with the products of human free will, see 
Straumann, Roman Law, 45-6, and for the a priori argument, ibid., 66-70. 
social nature.40 As a result, it can be demonstrated not only a posteriori, like Aristotelian moral 
science, but a priori.  
Grotius used the same conception of naturally social human nature to define “what is right,” 
the iustum.41 In a piece of similar a priori reasoning, he argued that the iustum is what is not 
repugnant to a society of those who use reason. He then, however, made a move that we do 
find in Suárez and indeed in most of the scholastics, which is to argue over from “what is right” 
objectively to the rights that are held subjectively by individuals. He called this kind of right a 
“moral quality.”42 I think it is arguable that this is in itself a “resolutive” move: that is, from 
what is not repugnant to human society we track back to the rights to do those actions. Just as 
for the scholastics, these rights are moral entities (in this case, moral qualities), and as such 
they are subject to moral reasoning, as we saw above with the right to the means of self-
preservation. But, and this is a big but, they have through the iustum a hard a priori edge in 
consistency or inconsistency with natural human society. This hard edge serves to restrict the 
category of individual rights to “perfect” rights, by which he meant those faculties that are the 
object of what the scholastics called “commutative,” what Grotius called “rectificatory,” 
justice.43 They are spaces of dominium in which the individual’s will is the determining factor. 
Rights in the sense of claims of merit, the object of distributive justice, are not properly rights.  
This hard a priori edge in a scientific, independently identifiable nature distinguishes Grotius’s 
natural jurisprudence from Alberico Gentili’s, for whom the appeal to nature is an element of 
our shared moral rhetoric.44 But a priori reasoning is inadequate by itself to cope with the rights 
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that individuals actually have. Purely a priori, all individuals have rights to do anything not 
incompatible with human society. But, of course, as a matter of fact they do not. They have 
particular sets of rights that are the results of multiple historical contractual arrangements. We 
shall see at the end how important this was to his “moral” way of thinking. Nevertheless, 
granted the individual’s will is the determinant of rights, the question immediately arises of 
how we are to interpret that will, given that it is invisible in itself. In his key chapter “On 
interpretation,” Grotius argued that there must be some general procedural rules in order to 
avoid a collapse into pure subjectivity of meaning. Such a collapse would mean that the matter 
could never be decided, “which is reputed impossible in moral matters.” To avoid it, in a 
context of inevitable obscurity, we have to use “the most probable signs,” of which there are 
two types, words and conjectures, and there are rules governing how these are to be 
interpreted.45 It is here, rather than in the appeal to nature, that Grotius finds space for the 
rhetorical dimension of moral reasoning. 
By reworking the scholastic distinction between “morals” and “naturals” through the concept 
of a naturally social human nature and consequent “perfect” rights, Grotius was able to 
construct an interface between moral and legal science that allowed for a complex back-and-
forth between the two kinds of reasoning. By contrast, Grotius saw a much more 
straightforward distinction between legal science and the science of politics, and here he again 
departed from his Aristotelian philosopher contemporaries. Politics, for them, was a practical 
science, and thus shaped by the same kind of “moral” reasoning as ethics. Moreover, influential 
voices in the humanist Aristotelian tradition commenting on Nicomachean Ethics Book I, in 
which Aristotle declares that his enquiry in this work is politikē tis, a kind of civil science, had 
denied any sharp difference between ethics and politics. For Piccolomini, a “universal 
philosophy of morals” was precisely the same as “civil philosophy.” Likewise for van Giffen, 
ethics just is politics: ethics has no independent identity in Aristotle’s scheme of the various 
arts and sciences.46 Both of them were prepared to see some kind of differentiation between 
the theoretical and the practical aspects of “political science” in this all-encompassing sense, 
so that the Ethics contains the principles and the Politics the practice. Following Aristotle 
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himself in Nicomachean Ethics Book VI, Chapter 8, they made a distinction between the 
universal or “architectonic” (architektonikē) science of passing laws (nomothetikē) and the 
science of particular political actions, this latter being commonly called politikē or politics 
itself.47 Piccolomini explained that such activity is specifically called “politics” not because of 
its dignity, but because of its use (usus), which is visible to the people.48 From a scientific point 
of view, however, both van Giffen and Piccolomini were clear that political science includes 
both moral science and jurisprudence. 
Grotius, however, deliberately resisted any attempt to “theorize” political science in this way. 
For him, Aristotle’s unqualified merit was to have written a work of Politics that was purely 
about politics. He drew a contrast with Jean Bodin, whose work, he declared, had mixed up 
politics and jurisprudence. For Grotius, political science (ars politica) teaches quid ex usu sit 
facere, “what needs to be done on the basis of use.” He thus apparently positioned as the 
entirety of political science the usus that Piccolomini had characterized as simply the most 
mundane and vulgarly obvious part of it. On this basis Grotius was able to contrast 
jurisprudence, which does handle principles, with politics, which does not, a contrast that he 
also (albeit briefly) framed in terms of the distinction between the useful (utile) and the right 
(iustum).49 As the case of sovereignty shows, however, the “resolutive” approach that 
characterizes moral reasoning allowed him to take the effective reality of a political situation 
into account whilst still claiming to offer a legal rather than a political analysis. Indeed, as we 
shall see, for Grotius political science was not properly analytic at all.  
3. – Resolving sovereignty 
Grotius tackled the issue of sovereignty in Chapter III of Book I, which concerns who has the 
power to declare war. Political power (potestas civilis), he began, is “the moral faculty of 
governing the political community” (facultas moralis gubernandi civitatem).50 It is, then, 
another case of a moral entity, to which moral reasoning can apply. What does this power 
consist in? “Aristotle sets up three parts in administering the commonwealth, deliberation on 
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common affairs, the responsibility to select magistrates, and legal judgements.”51 In starting 
with this reference to Aristotle, Grotius departed from the scholastics to begin his tacit critical 
engagement with Bodin, for this is the passage that Bodin in his Method for the Easy 
Comprehension of History (first edition 1566) had used in order to criticize Aristotle for not 
conceptualizing sovereignty properly (and hence, given that for Bodin the commonwealth 
depends on sovereign power, not having an adequate politics at all). Bodin’s objection was that 
Aristotle had treated all of these on a par, whereas, in Bodin’s view, deliberation and judgement 
can belong to non-sovereigns, with only the appointment of magistrates a distinctively 
sovereign power.52 
Grotius did not directly engage with this critique. But he implicitly agreed that Aristotle’s 
political analysis of “three parts” in the Politics needed correcting, and he proceeded to do so 
by means of Aristotle’s bipartite distinctions in Ethics VI. As we have seen, Aristotle there 
distinguished within political science between architektonikē (nomothetikē) and politikē more 
commonly so-called. He then specified that the latter consists in bouleutikē (concerned with 
deliberation or counsel) and dikastikē (concerned with judicial matters). Grotius translated this 
into series of dichotomies of his own. Thus, he said, a ruler’s activity takes place either by 
himself (or itself) or by means of others; by himself, is either in respect of universal matters or 
in respect of particular matters; such particular matters can be either public or private. 
Architektonikē is legislative science and is universal. Politikē is particular and is equivalent to 
bouleutikē in being concerned with particular matters that are directly public, e.g. war and 
peace, making treaties, taxation. Finally, dikastikē or “judicial science” is concerned with 
particular matters that are private but nevertheless of public interest. Surprisingly, however, 
given that he had specifically mentioned the appointment of magistrates, Grotius did not 
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concern himself with it; he merely remarked that what the ruler does not do by him- or itself, 
he/it does through others, who are magistrates or other officials, including ambassadors.53 
Grotius was not the first to read the tripartite distinction in the Politics in the light of Aristotle’s 
two dichotomies in the Ethics. Van Giffen, in his commentary on the latter, also cross-
referenced the two, and his moves make an interesting comparison. Using the terminology of 
Senatus (counsel or deliberation, bouleutikē), Magistratus (magistracy in general, not 
specifically the appointment of magistrates) and Iudicium (judgement) for Aristotle’s three 
parts, he argued that Aristotle’s primary distinction in both works was in fact bipartite: between 
a properly ruling, i.e. sovereign, element and an administrative element. In the Ethics 
commentary, he put Magistratus alone as administrative (administer). In the Politics 
commentary, by contrast, both judges and magistrates are administrative (administri), and only 
Senatus is sovereign (Aristotle’s kurion, which van Giffen translated princeps). Senatus is here 
said to include legislation, the right of war and peace, the appointment of magistrates and in 
fact all the other things that Bodin called the “marks” of sovereignty.54 In a less complicated 
way, the English Aristotelian John Case had also interpreted the Ethics VI passage in terms of 
a bipartite distinction between “that which makes laws” and “that which is popularly called 
executive.”55  
In the light of this we can see that, although Grotius had begun by quoting Aristotle as if there 
were no distinction at all between sovereign and administrative functions (“Aristotle sets up 
three parts in administering the commonwealth”), in fact his first dichotomy (a ruler’s activity 
takes place either by him- or itself or by means of others) reflects a distinction between the two 
forms of political activity that had already been made by other commentators. But Tuck is 
nevertheless right to suggest that he did not then try to define sovereign power as a particular 
kind of power within the (revised) Aristotelian mix.56 In this he differed sharply from van 
Giffen, whose strategy was designed to defeat Bodin on his own ground at the price of 
accepting the Bodinian definition of sovereignty. Grotius, in contrast, kept Aristotle’s three 
elements from Nicomachean Ethics VI (not Politics IV) on a par as different but equal functions 
of civil power, not seeing the “universal” element of law-making as any more a sovereign 
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activity than the “particular” activities of deliberation or judgement. Sovereign power is just 
this tripartite civil power with summitas – highest-ness, subjection to none – layered on top 
(addita summitate).57 
The position that Grotius adopted in The Law of War and Peace comes into relief in comparison 
with his earlier works. In The Law of Prize, following the account in Chapter 2 of the genesis 
of the commonwealth from the natural society of mankind, we find a series of marginal 
headings that echo some of the “parts” of Politics IV.14. The first is Respublica et cives, the 
commonwealth and the citizens; then comes Iudicium, and then Magistratus. “Law properly-
speaking” (Lex proprie dicta) comes under Respublica et cives, as “the will of the universi [the 
citizens as forming one body] directed towards the universi.” Iudicium is instead “the will of 
the universi directed towards individuals, in the light of the public good.” Finally, Magistratus 
is linked directly with the necessity of administration. In this sequence, then, law-making and 
judgement are both sovereign functions of the Respublica et cives, with magistracy the 
administrative, non-sovereign function. Grotius made this clear by asserting (with a marginal 
reference to the Dominican scholastic Francisco de Vitoria) that “civil power, which is seen in 
laws and judgements, is primarily and per se in the commonwealth (respublica) itself.” That 
this power is sovereign power is clear a little further on, with the declaration that “above (supra) 
the commonwealth, which is a multitude sufficient in itself, there is no greater power 
(imperium).’”58 In The Law of Prize, then, Grotius accepted the Bodinian position on law-
making as a distinctively sovereign power. His inclusion of judgement as an equally sovereign 
power, however, was another marker of his debt to the scholastics, who did not draw a sharp 
line between the supreme power to legislate and supreme jurisdiction in the sense of not 
recognizing a superior.59  
Grotius developed his thought on sovereignty in De imperio summarum potestatum circa 
sacra, composed between 1614 and 1617. Here, his concern to argue the power of the sovereign 
over religious affairs led him to stress both the unity of the sovereign ruler and the universality 
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of sovereign power.60 He argued for the necessary unity of the sovereign through a resolutive 
procedure, much like that in The Law of War and Peace, back from the “effects” to the “powers 
and faculties” that cause them. The effects of sovereignty are obligation and coercion: were the 
power to be divided between plural sovereigns, a subject could potentially be obliged to two 
things simultaneously. But such an effect is impossible, hence sovereign power cannot be 
divided. In a case of apparent division of sovereignty between king and estates, the real 
situation, Grotius asserted, is that either the estates alone are sovereign, or the “body” of both 
king and estates together is sovereign. Thus, there is always only one sovereign, and its 
sovereign power is accordingly universal, not limited to a particular domain. With a reference 
to Aristotle, Grotius characterised the “science of ruling” (ars regnandi) involved in 
sovereignty as architektonikē – not as contrasted with politikē, however, but rather as a 
universal science that embraces all the others.61  
In De imperio, then, Grotius espoused a Bodinian thesis on unity. Strikingly, this appears to be 
in direct contrast to the position on divisibility that he had espoused in his defence of the Dutch 
Revolt, the Commentarius in Theses XI (of uncertain date but almost certainly later in the same 
decade as The Law of Prize).62 It is not clear, however, that Grotius in either work saw a conflict 
between scholastic thought on summa potestas and Bodin’s thesis of indivisibility, both of 
which he endorsed at the level of the power itself. In De imperio, he supported his position on 
the king-and-estates scenario with a reference not only to Bodin but to Vitoria and to the Jesuit 
Francisco Suárez, whose The Laws and God the Lawgiver had been published in 1612.63 The 
references to Bodin and Vitoria are already there in the Commentarius.64 Nevertheless, there is 
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1994), at 228-9. I share the translator’s slight unease (“Foreword,” 205) with the translation of actus 
undoubtedly a difference in emphasis between the two works. De imperio is concerned to 
articulate a unitary and all-embracing sovereign power. The Commentarius equally posits the 
existence of this power, but is more concerned to articulate instead the possibility of dividing 
its “acts” or functions (actus). 
As Peter Borschberg has noted, the similarity between the Commentarius and The Law of War 
and Peace in this respect is very striking.65 Both of these works are more concerned with legal 
distributions of power that cross between states than with the power of a single state, whether 
vis-à-vis its internal constituents or vis-à-vis an external enemy: the inter-political rather than 
the strictly political. The Commentarius addresses the complex political relationship between 
Spain and the Low Countries at the time of the Dutch Revolt, a relationship, on Grotius’s 
account, which Spain aggressively violated and to which the Dutch were forced to respond not 
merely by vindicating their share of the actus, but by vindicating their sovereign power itself. 
The Law of War and Peace rehearses all the historic inter-political relationships of the 
Commentarius, and imagines more. However, the position on power and function (actus) that 
supports divisibility in the Commentarius falls foul of the resolutive demand of De imperio, 
according to which we judge powers from effects. Divided functions or “acts” imply, precisely, 
divided powers. Grotius in The Law of War and Peace therefore needed some way in which to 
block a resolution that went as far back as dividing the sovereign power of the commonwealth, 
and thus dividing the commonwealth itself. He achieved this through his famous split-level 
analysis, not of the nature, but of the location of sovereign power. 
Returning to Book I, Chapter III, then, after defining sovereign power Grotius proceeded to the 
contentious question of its location. Here he made his key distinction between the “common 
subject,” which is the civitas, and the “proper subject,” which is the ruler.66 This distinction 
has some antecedents in scholastic thought. On the scholastic account, political power is an all-
embracing power for the preservation and well-being of the political community. It originates 
at the moment of the formation of that community, and rests at that moment in the community 
as a whole. In order to be exercised effectively, however, it needs to be transferred, on the 
community’s terms, to a ruler or rulers who are different from the community itself. But in 
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cases of outright tyranny on their part, it devolves in some way back down to the community.67 
The community is thus the default holder of political power – but not sovereign power, which, 
for the scholastics, was always the power of the ruler. But Grotius was unwilling to abandon 
his original and constant position, developed in the context of the Dutch Revolt and of the 
ensuing war with Portugal and Spain, that the civitas is in some way the subject of sovereign 
power. In The Law of War and Peace, his solution was to make the civitas the “common 
subject” of sovereignty through an analogy between the moral faculty of governing and the 
natural faculty of sight. Sight, as a faculty of the soul, is located in the eye as the “proper 
subject.” Its “common subject,” however, is the whole body, which is vivified by the soul of 
which the faculty of sight is a part.68 It is this that constitutes the historic political identity of 
the civitas as a nation or a people: a living body of human beings that exists in time and place, 
that can be exiled, and can settle again.69 
For all that Grotius undoubtedly borrowed from the scholastics, then, his conception of the 
common subject is not a direct debt to their thought. It is the result of a demand for a 
“resolution” of sovereignty for which they had no conceptual need. As said at the outset, 
however, it comes with the key political consequence that sovereignty as actually exercised 
has no necessary location in the people (populus) that it governs. Grotius spelled this out 
explicitly, allowing even total alienation of power, in the manner of a person engaging to be 
the slave of a master, as a possibility (although not a necessity: Grotius’s sense of the 
contingency of the location of sovereign power was a further debt to the scholastics). He 
continued in the following section with a series of attacks on the sacred cows of popular 
sovereignty, for example that the constituent is necessarily greater than the constituted, or that 
the king is for the sake of the kingdom. Neither of these, he argued, is necessarily the case 
(although he did concede that it is often the case). He had, moreover, a sharp remark to make 
on the appeal to “the people” made by “popular” states, i.e. republics. There is no state so 
popular, he argues, that it does not exclude from the people “the very poor, or strangers, women 
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and adolescents.”70 Contrary to contemporary theories of popular sovereignty, for Grotius the 
exclusion of these people from “the people” is a constitutional matter. However popular the 
state, the exclusions that all popular states involve in fact make them less popular. 
4. – Dividing sovereignty 
Given that sovereign power does not have to be located in the people as its proper subject, the 
question now arises of how we are to diagnose its location in different constitutional 
arrangements. Here Grotius continued his implicit engagement with Bodin, who had argued 
that sovereignty must be both perpetual and undivided, ruling out any kind of “mixed 
constitution.” In the case of the Roman republic, the first condition meant that, although the 
dictator who was appointed in times of crisis appeared to have sovereign power, he in fact did 
not because his power was only temporary. The second meant that the Greek historian of Rome, 
Polybius, was wrong in his famous analysis of the Roman republic as a mixed constitution. It 
was in fact a democracy, in which the people was sovereign. Grotius in The Law of War and 
Peace differed profoundly because, as we have seen, he allowed that the Roman dictator was 
sovereign. He also differed on the second point, in that he allowed sovereignty to be divided. 
But this is not because he did not make any distinction in this work between sovereignty and 
administration; he did, and in fact he agreed with Bodin that Polybius was wrong about the 
Roman republic. We need, therefore, to look more closely at what he says about the Roman 
example. 
We have already seen how Grotius argued for the sovereignty of the dictator using “moral” 
resolution.71 A little further on he separated his mode of analysis from that of “people writing 
politics” (politica scribentes) like Polybius, who, looking only at the actions (actiones) and not 
the right of acting (ius agendi), i.e. looking only at “the external form and the day-to-day 
administration” (externa species et quotidiana administratio), had diagnosed in the Roman 
republic a mixed constitution – whereas in fact sovereignty (summum imperium) lay with the 
people and it was therefore a popular state.72 Here, then, is the distinction Grotius made in the 
preface between political science and jurisprudence, associated with a contrast between daily 
administration and sovereignty, external form and moral nature. A slightly different phrase 
occurs in a passage a little earlier on, where Grotius warns his readers not to be deceived by 
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the ambiguous sound of a name and the species externarum rerum, “form of external things.” 
The Roman emperors were called principes, or “first citizens,” but it would be wrong to infer 
from this terminology that Rome was still a republic, since they “held openly and without 
disguise the most absolute monarchical power.”73 This may constitute another implicit critique 
of Bodin, who in the Six livres (1576) (Book II, Ch. 1) had drawn a distinction between “en 
matiere d’estat” and “en termes de droit.” “En matiere d’estat,” the one who commands the 
force, commands the commonwealth. But “en termes de droit,” this is not so. The Roman 
emperors were in effect sovereign monarchs, but legally they were no more than “princes,” 
first citizens. From the point of view of the law, therefore, the Roman state remained a 
republic.74 
Finally, in an important passage in Book II Grotius again distinguished the viewpoint of the 
jurist from that of the political scientist, and again used the case of Rome. Here he argued that 
Rome remained the same civitas, as the same people and the same “common subject” of 
sovereignty, despite all the vicissitudes of its various proper subjects of sovereignty (king, 
people, emperor). This is the form (species) of the civitas that the jurist looks at. By contrast, 
the political scientist looks at the form which consists in the “relation of the parts between 
themselves, the rulers and the ruled.” Because this changed radically at Rome, Rome did not 
remain the same on a political analysis.75 Although it is not completely clear that the externa 
species of Book I is the species of Book II that the political scientist looks at, in both books the 
distinction between political science and jurisprudence clearly lies in the faculty-function 
model that the jurist uses but the political scientist does not. The latter is able to distinguish 
“morally” between the actions (actiones) of “day-to-day administration” and the operationes 
or workings of an underlying sovereign power. In this way Grotius was able to craft a 
jurisprudence that could accommodate the reality of power in a political community without 
collapsing into reason of state. In contrast to Bodin, who defended his jurisprudential account 
of sovereignty at Rome against a kind of realist or de facto political science, for Grotius it is 
jurisprudence, not political science, which tells you that the Roman emperors were absolute 
monarchs rather than “first citizens” of a continuing republic. We might call it a kind of realist 
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jurisprudence. On my account, it is precisely his conception of “morals” that allows him this 
position. 
Rome, then, was not a permanent democracy; rather, the sovereignty completely changed 
hands. Nor was it ever a mixed constitution. But that is not because it never could have been. 
Grotius was as clear as he had always been that, as a global and supreme “moral faculty of 
governing the civitas,” sovereign power is one, undivided thing despite the fact that it is made 
up of the “parts” we saw earlier. It can be composite and still a unity.76 But, he argued, it can 
nevertheless be divided either in respect of its area of operation, or in respect of the subjects of 
that power. His example of the first was the subsequent division of Roman sovereignty such 
that one emperor held the west and another the east, or when three emperors ruled the empire 
at the same time. His example of the second was the kind of arrangement between a people and 
a monarch in which the people reserves certain elements of political power to itself. In such a 
case, both the people and the monarch are sovereign.77 So, while Bodin had insisted on only 
one locus of sovereignty within the commonwealth, for Grotius in The Law of War and Peace 
that was not a legal principle, merely a recommendation of policy. I suggest this is one of the 
things he meant by saying in the preface that Bodin had mixed up politics and jurisprudence. 
“In political matters,” Grotius declared, “there is nothing completely free from inconvenience; 
and right is to be measured not from what seems best to this or that person, but on the will of 
that from whence the right arises.”78 
Here, then, the theoretical possibility of dividing sovereignty is made legally workable and 
politically real through the jurisprudence of “perfect” rights, which, as we saw in Section 2, is 
key to the Grotian interface between legal and moral science. The proper subject of sovereign 
power is not just a subject but a holder of it; and, if a legitimate holder, will hold it by right. 
Running sovereignty through the matrix of rights in this way gave Grotius huge analytic power 
in addressing the contemporary state of Europe, because the extreme contingency inherent in 
“perfect” rights allowed for its complicated history. Importantly for his political purposes, it 
enabled him to defend the sovereign power of a variety of princes whose status as true 
sovereigns might otherwise seem questionable. We have already seen, with the case of the 
dictator, how moral reasoning vindicates his sovereign right, even if it is temporary. Grotius 
appealed to Roman legal forms to add two further ways of holding the right of sovereignty: as 
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full property, or as a usufruct.79 For him, all these forms are equally “perfect” rights, and any 
perfect right can be defended in law, or by war if there is no superior judge (as a fortiori is the 
case if we are talking about sovereignty). Usufruct or temporary right are not positions of being 
in some way “inferior” to the proprietor, that is, not “superior” or not sovereign. Grotius argued 
that this is only so if the right is “precarious,” meaning that it can be revoked at any time by 
the granter. But he distinguished usufruct and temporary right from precarious right in this 
sense.80 Certainly, a monarch with usufruct and not property in the sovereignty could not 
alienate it or damage its integrity in any other way. But, presuming she did neither of those, 
and presuming she did not share the sovereignty with any other party, her exercise of sovereign 
power was as absolute as that of the “patrimonial” king next door. 
More importantly from a conceptual point of view, the equality of “perfect” rights offered 
Grotius a way to theorize the complicated inter-political situations characteristic of early 
modern Europe (for example the vexed question of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, 
or the situation between Spain and the Low Countries prior to the Dutch Revolt) without 
recourse to any notion of hierarchy or vertical ordering. Division between proper subjects of 
sovereignty, whether within one political community or across two (or more), is instead 
horizontal, in terms of different rights to exercise different functions of sovereignty. Precisely 
his hard-edged rights, then, supply the possibility of much more “soft-edged” inter-political 
arrangements. Moreover, his frank acceptance of “inconvenience” meant that he did not have 
to design any further features of the constitutional relationship that a more idealizing mode of 
theory would demand. In comparison with other attempts to defend the possibility of mixed 
constitution against Bodin, the Grotian rights-based model has the advantage of being almost 
infinitely flexible.81 It offers the possibility of quite fine-grained division without falling into 
theoretical incoherence; and, despite the ever-present possibility of “inconvenience,” Grotius 
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clearly felt that such arrangements were not only workable in practice but in many cases 
desirable. 
One place to see this is in his handling of the law of war in Book III. In his chapter “Moderation 
in obtaining imperium” (meaning both empire in our sense and sovereignty), Grotius accepted 
that the law of war allows a conquering nation to wipe out the sovereignty of the vanquished 
entirely, and therefore to destroy it as a civitas with its own political identity. But he argued 
that this was almost always a bad thing to do, both in terms of virtue and in terms of policy. 
Ideally, the conquered should be left in full possession of their sovereignty. However, he was 
also prepared to suggest compromise arrangements somewhere between political annihilation 
and full sovereignty, accepting that to leave a conquered nation with the latter might constitute 
a future threat. It was possible, he suggested, to take some part of the sovereignty while leaving 
the conquered with another part of it, and he referred back to his remarks in Book I on the 
“mixing” of sovereignty to provide the juridical foundations for such solutions.82 What we 
might characterize pejoratively as a practice of empire, then, Grotius saw as the kind of 
interpolity that was perfectly familiar from European history, and perfectly compatible with 
the separate identity of both nations as “common subjects” of sovereignty.83 Division here is 
positively valorized because it can slide around either/or questions of sovereignty that Grotius 
thought were just bad questions. Not only are they conceptually mal posées, they are also an 
opening to vice and to a cynical reason of state, rather than to virtue and good policy; in the 
final analysis, to war rather than to peace.  
Conclusion 
Over the course of this discussion we have seen how the field of “morals” and its associated 
reasoning operate to shape the distinctive legal and political world of The Law of War and 
Peace. On this analysis, sovereignty is certainly a legal phenomenon, but it cannot be isolated 
as such. The way that it is folded into “morals” gives Grotian sovereignty its non-Bodinian and 
non-Hobbesian character, and it is for this reason that Grotius’s theory resists being positioned 
within any genealogy of modern sovereignty. But that does not mean that it is in some way 
“medieval,” and therefore of no value of us today. Grotius was attempting to theorize it within 
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a wholly new kind of science, a jurisprudence that occupies a middle ground between a purely 
a priori theory of rights and law on the one hand and a concrete political science on the other. 
If I am right, “morals” is the master-science of that middle ground, and what Grotius did in The 
Law of War and Peace was to mobilize it to construct an international order that is 
conceptualized inter-politically rather than politically in a narrow sense 
I am not suggesting that we have, in Grotius, a beautiful but forgotten solution to the current 
tension between popular aspirations to democratic sovereignty and the demands of 
international executive rule. But there is nevertheless something interesting for us about the 
way in which Grotius handles the question. He was addressing a very messy, from the 
“modern” point of view, state of Europe (but not only of Europe), with all sorts of bits and 
pieces of jurisdictions subject to an infinity of historic legal arrangements. Where we see 
fragmentation, however, Grotius saw instead the positive political phenomenon of division. To 
theorize this optic, he moved the either/or of sovereignty from sovereign power itself to the 
rights to exercise it, and argued that those rights can be of different forms and held individually 
by several parties at the same time. Whatever the legal arrangement, however, it remains the 
case on his theory that whoever holds any right to exercise any part of the sovereignty is, as 
such, sovereign of the very country in which the sovereign power resides as in its common 
subject. It is this that distinguishes it from the pure functionalism analyzed by Orford as 
involved in modern responsibility to protect. The UN, stepping in to protect a people when its 
own sovereign fails to, does not constitute itself legally sovereign of that people. But for 
Grotius, no such legal evasion is possible. Provided the people remains a “common subject” of 
sovereignty, his “moral” jurisprudence tells us that an “outside” body exercising sovereignty 
over them is their own sovereign, however temporary. Just as with the Roman dictator, the fact 
that the power is temporary does not make it any the less sovereign. In this way, Grotius’s 
international jurisprudence is political in a way that modern international executive rule is not. 
To make this point is not to set aside the hard issue of democracy and the disquieting, to our 
eyes, distance between the common subject and the proper subject. From this point of view, 
Grotian interpolity looks like nothing so much as the ancien régime and its empires, 
systematized and justified through the matrix of property rights. On my account, there is no 
denying its political conservatism in a domestic context, even if, in an “external” context – to 
hold on to that contrast for a moment – Grotius offered proposals for peace that were quite 
radical from a contemporary point of view. Even in the domestic context, however, the 
functional model does not always operate against the people as the “proper subject” of 
sovereignty. It allows the people to be the sovereign, as in the Roman republic, or it allows 
them to have a share of it, perhaps the share they can most easily exercise. A people that only 
acts to elect a legislature from time to time can hardly be said to be the sovereign, but it 
nevertheless exercises a sovereign function and is sovereign in that capacity, if not in others. 
Perhaps that is just how the constitution works. Finally, and from a more critical point of view, 
Grotius explicitly draws attention to the exclusionary nature of “the people” as the proper 
subject of sovereignty: the lack of fit between the political “people” and the real people of a 
country, which still obtains today both in theory and in practice. Modern democracies may 
have given the vote to women and the very poor (although the latter is in practice highly 
dubious), but young people below a certain age and resident aliens (ordinarily) have none, let 
alone migrants and refugees, who are the very poorest of the poor. For Grotius, wherever there 
is any “proper subject” of sovereignty, whatever its nature, some people are still, and in all 
respects, subject. It is another form of evasion to suggest otherwise. If his “moral” 
jurisprudence challenges the legal logic and rhetoric of international bodies, then, it also 
questions the ideology of democracy. 
In the face of the current tension between exclusivist populist democracy and a purely 
functionalist international, Grotius’s first answer might be to point to the virtue of moderation, 
and to the possibility of softening the antagonism – losing the either/or – through various forms 
of division between plural “proper subjects” of sovereignty. But he would not think it enough 
only to pick up the notion of divisibility with its underlying functional model, however 
attractive that might seem. His “political” is not purely functional all the way down; for, with 
the “common subject,” we are not dealing with “a people” that is just a body with needs for 
various functions to be exercised – although it is that, as well – but a people with a historic 
political identity.84 The only way forward, on his model, would be simultaneously to insist on 
the directly political nature of international bodies and on the mutual implication of every 
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nation’s historic political identity with that of every other. Grotius’s theory recognizes that the 
creation of a new inter-political order in this way would not be easy, but that does not mean 
that any such attempt is condemned only to replicate the ancien régime in modern form. We 
might not share his “morals”, but he challenges us to think about our own. 
 
 
